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The usefulness of distinguishing types
of aggression by functionn
J. Martı´n Ramı´rez
Problems of aggression and
violence are widespread and
affect interpersonal relation-
ships, inter-group interac-
tions and society in general.
It is therefore important to
better understand human
aggression by carrying out
more in-depth studies of the
complex dynamics that exist
between biological variables
(genes, biochemistry, neural
circuits), personality factors
and environmental circum-
stances that inﬂuence the
development and expression
of aggression (Nelson and
Trainor 2007).
To better understand a
phenomenon – aggression
and violence, for example –
we ﬁrst need to formulate a
working deﬁnition that is as
precise as possible and estab-
lishes a consensus on what
is under discussion; on the
differences that may exist
between violence and ag-
gression; their causes and
mechanisms, and their possi-
ble consequences. For exam-
ple, it should be decided
whether violence is comple-
tely unavoidable or, to
the contrary, avoidable, as
declared in the Seville State-
ment on Violence (Adams
et al. 1986) adopted by the
General Conference of
UNESCO in 1989, or
whether certain acts of
aggression are justiﬁable
in speciﬁc circumstances
or always unacceptable;
a topic researched by the
author and colleagues
in very diverse cultures
(Ramı´rez 1991, 1993,
2007b).
Clariﬁcation is still
needed on the conceptual
difference between aggres-
sion and violence. Many
authors, in an attempt to
present the two along a
continuum, tend to establish
violence as an extreme form
of aggression. Ample con-
texts exist, however, in
which aggression is seen,
on the contrary, as more
serious and punishable than
mere violence, such as in
cases judged by committees
on violence in sport or
studies on aggression in the
media, where attacks on
inanimate objects are classi-
ﬁed as violence (for instance,
the burningof cars or homes
and the destruction of prop-
erty), but the concept of
aggression is often limited
to attacks on people.
Other authors, using
the dichotomy identiﬁed
J. Martı´n Ramı´rez heads the Research
Group on the Sociopsychobiology of
Aggression, Institute of Biofunctional Stu-
dies and Psychobiology Department, Uni-
versidad Complutense de Madrid.
Hismain areas of research include aggression
in a wide range of animal species (from an
interdisciplinary perspective), in humans
(from a cross-cultural perspective) and in a
wide variety of cultures in Europe, Asia,
Africa andNorthAmerica. ProfessorRamı´rez
also studies the underlying psychological
processes involved in various forms of aggres-
sion, with a special focus on sexual dimorph-
ism; the moderating role of different contexts
that predispose towards and are associated
with violence. Professor Ramı´rez has recently
researched political violence and terrorism,
being research fellow with the International
Security Programme,Belfer Centre for Science
and International Affairs, Kennedy School of
Government at HarvardUniversity and at the
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and
Peace, Stanford University.
Related publications include J. Martin
Ramı´rez, The Ulster Peace Process as an
experience of peacebuilding, in Behavioral
Sciences on Terrorism and Violence, 3(1),
2011, 72–76; Daniel Antonius, Adam D.
Brown, Tali K. Walters, J. Martin Ramirez
and Samuel Justin Sinclair (eds) Interdisciplin-
ary Analyses of Terrorism, Cambridge Scho-
lars Publishing (2010) and J. Martin Ramı´rez
(2009) Some dichotomous classiﬁcations of
aggression according to its function, in Journal
of Organisational Transformation and Social
Change 6(2), 85–101; J. Martin Ramı´rez,
(2007) Peace through dialogue in International
Journal on World Peace, 24(1), 65–81 and J.
Martin Ramı´rez, (2007). Justiﬁcation of
aggression in several Asian and European
countries with different religious and cultural
background in International Journal of Beha-
vioral Development, 31(1),: 9–15.
Email: mramirez@med.ucm.es
www: http://www.jmartinramirez.org
ISSJ 200–201rUNESCO2011. Published byBlackwell PublishingLtd., 9600GarsingtonRoad,Oxford,OX4 2DK,UKand 350MainStreet,Malden,MA02148,USA.
by Erich Fromm (1973), present aggression and
violence as two opposing biological concepts.
Fromm distinguishes between a biological form
of aggression based on adaptation, common in
all animal species including humans, and a
malignant form not based on adaptation, which
appears to occur only in human beings. Go´mez-
Jarabo (1999) calls this malignant aggression
violence and limits the term aggression to
describe that which serves an adaptive purpose
or is beneﬁcial.
For Go´mez-Jarabo, then, aggression is a
natural form of behaviour based on biology; one
that is adaptive, intentional, purposeful and
common to the entire animal kingdom. In
principle it is seen as a positive and normal
response to adverse circumstances within the
limits of self-control and at times even justiﬁable
and beneﬁcial to the survival of an individual or
an entire species. A certain amount of aggression
could in fact be necessary as an act of self-
afﬁrmation when taking initiatives such as
establishing one’s identity and participating in
cooperative and competitive activities. Count-
less examples of this are found in the animal
kingdom: such as defending territory, protection
of young and ﬁghts between males during the
mating season.When correctly channelled, then,
aggression appears to be intrinsic to the animal
kingdom, designed to ensure the survival of the
individual and the species. In the case of humans
it is the force that enables a person to be healthily
self-assertive and autonomous and to control
both the environment and the self.
When the use of that force goes beyond
what is acceptable, however, aggression
becomes violence, which is always unacceptable
in the well-founded view of Go´mez-Jarabo
(1999). Violence is therefore a negative, excessive
and inappropriate form of behaviour when used
to destructive ends and should therefore be
condemned. It could be described as pathologi-
cal; a malignant biological transformation
resulting frommental dysfunction that is speciﬁc
to humans. This view coincides with the ﬁrst
deﬁnition of the word violence in the dictionary
of the Spanish Royal Academy: ‘‘the quality of
being violent’’, meaning ‘‘not in a natural state,
context or mode of action’’ – in other words, I
would add, behaviour that is pathological and
connected to situations of abuse and violent
domination.
This notwithstanding, violent behaviour is
subject to change, at least in theory, though this
requires changing both individuals and their
environment. How can this be done? Using
methods based on biology (cognitive behaviour-
al therapy and psycho-pharmacological treat-
ment) and by developing social skills
(programmes designed to promote security,
structure and bonds with other people).
The lack of consensus on aggression prob-
ably stems primarily from the plethora of
deﬁnitions, models and classiﬁcations found in
scientiﬁc literature (see, for example, Ramı´rez
1998, 2000, 2003). The term ‘‘aggression’’ is so
ambiguous and is used so widely and in such a
general, imprecise manner that it seems almost
impossible to establish a uniﬁed and compre-
hensive deﬁnition for it. Such a state of
terminological confusion is not surprising con-
sidering that over 100 deﬁnitions exist. Aggres-
sion is one of the words Pascal referred to as
‘‘primitive’’ and which many people understand
without needing a deﬁnition. Similarly, the term
‘‘violence’’ is somewhat ambivalent, as judge
Arturo Beltra´n (1999) skilfully demonstrates in
his study of the term in Spain’s Criminal Code.
Although violence is always identiﬁed as repre-
hensible and punishable, its deﬁnition is some-
times limited to vis physica or a physical attack
on a person (unlike the vis moralis involved in
intimidation). Another area of doctrine presents
ample jurisprudence in which the concept of
violence includes mere intimidation. Some even
extend the concept to objects – vis in rebus – in
cases where the freedom of individuals is also
affected (for example, changing a lock or digging
a ditch to prevent access to a home) or a person
being drugged and subsequently robbed (using
‘‘date rape’’ drugs).
In short, aggression can be viewed as a
category that covers a whole range of forms of
behaviour intended to cause harm. These forms
of behaviour may represent psychobiological
adjustments useful for the struggle for life, as
part of what is to some extent positive competi-
tion. From this angle, aggression plays a
protective and organisational role that can help
to generate the impetus needed to deﬁne a social
structure and achieve lasting peace. On other
occasions, however, aggression can be expressed
out of context, without necessary self-control
and produce destructive consequences (Nelson
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and Trainor, 2007). This is what some prefer to
call violence.
Far from being an unequivocal, one-dimen-
sional term, aggression is a heterogeneous and
complex phenomenon with a great variety of
meanings. This variability is reﬂected in the fact
that the term describes many phenomena that,
although similar in appearance, actually differ in
their functions and antecedents, genetic and
neural mechanisms, and the external factors by
which they are triggered. It is therefore a socio-
emotional process that is multifaceted (with
differing antecedents, manifestations and con-
sequences) and dynamic (continuously evolving,
both ontogenetically and phylogenetically)
(Gendreau and Archer 2005). As a result, it is
not enough to agree on a general deﬁnition
without ﬁrst establishing the existence of speciﬁc
functional types of aggression, each with differ-
ent regulatory mechanisms and determinants
(Bandura 2001).
Most of these manifold existing classiﬁca-
tions of human aggression – in our view, too
many – can be divided into those based on the
form it takes or how it is expressed, and those
that focus more on its function or goal. The
following examples are in no way exhaustive (for
a more detailed description, see Ramirez and
Andreu, 2003).
In 1961 Buss proposed a model based on
direction: active aggression (an action, such as
hitting another person) and passive aggression
(a lack of action, such as not avoiding – allowing
– someone to fall over a cliff). Studies on the
latter have appeared frequently in recent years in
the context of indirect forms of aggression
(Richardson and Hammock 2011; Richardson
andWarren 2007). A similar approach is used in
the distinction between externally directed
aggression (directed towards others) and intern-
ally directed aggression (directed at oneself), the
most extreme form of which is suicide. Other
models focus on the form that the aggression
takes (Buss 1961; Underwood 2003): physical
aggression, involving direct contact between
those involved; verbal aggression, involving
language and non-verbal (non-physical) aggres-
sion, which can be expressed symbolically or by
using different facial expressions and body
language.
Somemodels are based on the way in which
aggression is triggered in social interactions.
For example, a distinction is made between (a)
direct aggression, which includes acts usually
occurring during direct, physical or verbal social
interaction, that is, in face-to-face confronta-
tion; and (b) indirect aggression, in which, on the
contrary, there is no direct contact involved in
the social exchange between aggressor and
victim. Instead, the harm typically observed in
this kind of aggression is inﬂicted via an
intermediary – a person or an object – and in a
subtle way or even later in time. It is associated
with impulsive behaviour rather than aggressive
behaviour. Indirect aggression overlaps with
two other categories: social aggression and
relational aggression (Crick et al. 2002), which
involve manipulation of social relations to
damage friendship, reputation or social status.
Relational aggression is based on damage to
social ties, while social aggression additionally
includes negative facial expressions and gestures
(Gendreau and Archer 2005).
If we apply the same criteria to antisocial
behaviour, two other forms of aggression can be
identiﬁed – overt and covert – as suggested by
Little and Hawley (2002) and these are, to a
certain degree, comparable to direct and indirect
aggression. This can be seen in the signiﬁcant
correlation between overt-direct and relational-
indirect – aggression, so much so that the
authors refer to overt and relational aggression
and classify direct and indirect aggression as
subtypes. The authors have thus identiﬁed four
primary dimensions to aggression: overt-direct,
relational-indirect, instrumental-offensive and
reactive-defensive.
Another classiﬁcation method is based on
function, purpose or goal. In terms of the
reasons for inﬂicting aggression, a distinction
can be made between hostile aggression (based
simply on the pleasure of causing harm) and
instrumental aggression (aimed at achieving
non-aggressive goals) (see Bandura 1973; Buss
1961; Feshbach 1964). Other classiﬁcations
distinguish between reactive and proactive
aggression (Dodge 1991; Dodge and Coie
1987) or between impulsive and premeditated
aggression (Barratt and Felthous 2003; Coccaro
et al. 1989; Linnoila et al. 1983). While different
authors have developed different models with
different terms, this system of classiﬁcation
reveals certain parallels between these types of
aggressive behaviour. An analysis of empirical
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data from applied studies in our laboratory
reveals a signiﬁcant statistical link between
hostile, reactive and impulsive aggression, on
the one hand, and instrumental, proactive and
premeditated aggression, on the other (Ramı´rez
2009).
These hostile or instrumental and reactive
or active dichotomies are not always synon-
ymous: both instrumental and hostile aggression
can be proactive in that they may arise without
provocation. Similarly, a person can be hostile
without displaying the emotional anger asso-
ciated with reactive aggression (Vitaro and
Brendgen 2005). However, they suggest a shared
general focus:
1. A socio-cognitive type of aggression which
emphasises an instrumental-premeditated-
proactive-controlled-calculated-offensive-pre-
datory-in cold blood focus associated with a
positive view of aggression. The following
characteristics are included in this category:
instrumental, premeditated and proactive
aggression.
2. A second type – emotional – which empha-
sises a hostile-impulsive-reactive-uncon-
trolled-retaliatory-defensive-emotional-hot
blooded focus associated with a negative
view of aggression. Its characteristics are
hostile, impulsive and reactive aggression.
For the sake of conceptual clarity in categorisa-
tions of aggression, then, efforts should be made
to standardise terminology and certain methods
of measurement, or at least reduce the numbers
involved (Ramı´rez 2009).
Some acts of aggression have
multiple motives
For an analytical model of aggression to be a
proper and appropriate psychological construct,
it must be sufﬁciently reliable and valid. This is
often problematic given the difﬁculty of pre-
cisely establishing the motives and multiple
social, cultural and professional factors that
inﬂuence the different models of human aggres-
sion discussed above.
Certain authors (Bushman and Anderson
2001) believe that traditional opposition-based
classiﬁcations, useful though they were in
developing the ﬁrst theories on aggression, are
no longer relevant today, as they do not admit
that acts of aggression may be motivated by
multiple factors. This is likely to be true. In
certain circumstances an act of aggression can
fall under two or more categories simulta-
neously. For example, in many cases the act of
aggression can be both verbal (criticism of an
absent individual) and non-verbal (through
gestures or by ignoring or excluding them) or
even be a physical act (against that person’s
property, a co-species or inter-species other or
even an inanimate object). This interdependency
makes it considerably more difﬁcult to decide in
which category a given act of aggression should
fall. Other acts of aggression can be caused by a
wide variety of factors: cigarette smoke, unplea-
sant odours, high temperatures and even dis-
turbing scenes have all been proven to increase
hostility in a person or the level of punishment
meted out to others in laboratory experiments.
Natural observation has conﬁrmed this phe-
nomenon: violent crime tends to increase in hot
temperatures, which can also contribute to
family disorders (Berkowitz 1989).
In addition to the above, a singlemotive can
lead to different kinds of aggression. In many
laboratory experiments, for example, partici-
pants are asked to punish others as a form of
instrumental aggression. At the same time,
however, they may inﬂict a much more intense
level of punishment than is strictly necessary out
of a real desire to inﬂict harm upon the other
person. Here, a hostile element combines with
the instrumental in a single aggressive act.
Frequently, many acts of aggression arise
from unclear and multiple motives, combined
with numerous contributing factors. According
to Barratt and Felthous (2003), 40 per cent of
people commit either mostly impulsive or mostly
premeditated acts, while the remaining 60 per
cent – the majority, in other words – commit
acts that are a mixture of both. A good example
of this is revenge, which can be described as a
combination of both types of aggression –
spontaneous-reactive (hostile) and instrumental.
Revenge is clearly linked to rage – the idea being
to inﬂict as much suffering as possible upon the
offender in an attempt to avenge oneself upon
that person without regard for possible con-
sequences for oneself or society. There may
also be a cold determination to ‘‘educate the
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offender’’ using a form of moralising aggression
aimed at upholding justice. As this revenge
requires justiﬁcation, educational moral assis-
tance is sought to save the revenge from being
viewed as a new transgression. Overlapping
criteria therefore tend to be the norm rather
than the exception in different categories of
aggression.
We argue nevertheless that while an exhaus-
tive analysis of the form an act of aggression
takes may appear to be over simplistic (in
relation to the above-mentioned idea that most
aggressive acts are based on a combination of
motives) and ineffective when establishing a
model (see Bushman and Anderson 2001),
distinguishing the type of aggression in a
sufﬁciently reliable way becomes very useful
and important – essential, in fact – in determin-
ing the resulting effect and particularly the
function, motive or purpose of the aggressor
and his or her possible treatment. Different types
of aggression stem from different sources;
engender different emotional, cognitive and
behavioural consequences and have different
implications when diagnosing, preventing or
treating them (Kempes et al. 2005).
The importance of
categorising aggressionwhen
making legal decisions
Court rulings on criminal behaviour are based
on an interpretation of the acts in the framework
of rules of social conduct. ‘‘The state of mind
that the prosecution, to secure a conviction,
must prove that a defendant had when commit-
ting a crime; criminal intent or recklessness’’
(Garner, 1999, p.999) is legally known as mens
rea, which in Latin means a guilty mind. A
criminal act (actus reus) can only be deﬁned as
such in the presence of an essential component, a
criminal motive, intention or purpose on the
part of the perpetrator. In a criminal trial motive
is crucial; investigators use motives to generate
lists of suspects and both the prosecutor and
defence rely on motive to convince a jury of a
person’s innocence or guilt. Therefore, the key to
distinguishing whether an act is criminal, acci-
dental or committed on a legal, non-criminal
basis (self-defence, for example) is the criminal
intention of the offender – the guilt factor –
referred to in legal terminology as mens rea.
The legal process is at the heart of the
debate on human self-control. To what extent
can individuals control their behaviour in a
given situation? To what extent are acts of
aggression premeditated (that is, planned, inten-
tional or proactive) and to what extent are they
committed without thinking (impulsively or
reactively)? To what extent are aggressive acts
unconscious and to what extent do they show a
lack of concern as to possible consequences for
oneself and others? Mens rea presupposes that
individuals are capable of acting and anticipat-
ing possible consequences and are conscious of
what they are doing. Our western-based ones
justice systems are founded on the assumption
that people not suffering frommental illness can
control their behaviour. Criminal law is thus
based on the idea that criminals’ acts are
premeditated and that they make a choice: if
there is no choice, there is no criminal. Impul-
sivity, on the other hand, could affect one’s
ability to distinguish between right and wrong or
between reality and fantasy and therefore has a
bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused.
If impulsivity is unconscious, then knowing
what causes an act of aggression could be useful
in determining the degree to which a person
exercises free will – in other words, whether a
premeditated act is more culpable than an
impulsive one (Barratt and Felthous 2003).
Independently of the above, it is important
not to confuse impulsivity – a psychiatric term –
with a lack of premeditation, a legal term. While
the legal implications remain unclear, an impul-
sive crime is not synonymous with an unpreme-
ditated one. Acts of impulsive aggression and
unpremeditated crimes share some similarities
such as environmental triggers. Psychiatry,
however, cannot deﬁne the legal and moral
implications of impulsive behaviour. Distinc-
tions that are important in psychiatric categories
may have no legal relevance – impulsivity, for
example, could be an important factor in both
premeditated and unpremeditated crimes. With-
out examining the legal distinction between
impulsivity and premeditation in detail, while
motive remains a crucial element in the judicial
process and in determining innocence or guilt,
an analysis of different legal systems and
contexts – for example, the work of Bushman
Functional types of aggression 267
r UNESCO 2011.
and Anderson (2001) – would suggest that the
law is focusing less and less on motive to
determine what type of homicide has been
committed, for example.
Using modern neuroimaging techniques it
is possible to examine decision-making mechan-
isms in depth by observing the human brain in
action. What is free will, one may wonder, in an
individual predisposed to rage or violent beha-
viour? Could personal responsibility disappear
in the face of organic changes such as genetic
variations or brain damage? Reducing the space
for free will have surprising effects (Bordel et al.
2006). It would appear then that neuroscience
has begun to cast doubt on the idea of free will
and our subsequent responsibility for our actions.
Common mental elements of criminal
acts – intent, malice, premeditation and reck-
lessness – presume conscious awareness and the
ability to form a wish to act or to anticipate the
possible consequences of the action, or both. In
this regard, distinguishing between impulsive
and premeditated aggression in terms of mens
rea is important in forensic psychiatry, although
quantifying whether a psychological intent
amounts to a criminal intent and how much
conscious anticipation establishes a mental state
of recklessness may be difﬁcult in individual
cases (Barratt and Felthous 2003).
To summarise, an analysis of functional
types of aggression would seem particularly
useful in cases where criminal responsibility
must be established.
Categorising aggression is
also important for prediction
Aggression theories and models provide more
powerful explanations as they describe the ways
in which different personalities may be asso-
ciated with aggression. According to Douglas
and Ogloff (2003), risk assessment experts stress
the importance of clearly deﬁning the type of
aggression in all communications among rele-
vant institutions. Addressing both relatively
stable internal mechanisms (differences in per-
sonality traits among individuals) and external
situational variables will enable researchers to
make more accurate predictions when deﬁning
behavioural trends. Improved knowledge of
how they interact will provide clearer informa-
tion on individual differences in aggression and
personality dimensions that may forecast differ-
ent propensities towards aggression, regardless
of the speciﬁc processes operating and whether
they result from prior learning or genetic
inﬂuences.
For example, a meta-analysis (Bettencourt
et al. 2006) demonstrates that the interaction
between personality variables and the level of
provocation inﬂuences aggressive behaviour.
Speciﬁc personality traits, such as anger and
irritability, are sensitive to provocation, predict-
ing a tendency to be aggressive only when
provoked, after reﬂection, or being inclined to
irritability and aggressiveness in very different
situations, including under relatively neutral
conditions, that is, without needing to be
provoked, insulted, irritated or frustrated.
Clearly, there are individual differences in
the probability of frustration leading to an
attack. More than ﬁfty years ago Block and
Martin (1955) suggested that ego strength –
using terminology speciﬁc to the era – could
mediate the effects of frustration: children with
low ego strength reacted more aggressively than
others with high ego strength when prevented
from obtaining what they wanted, presumably
because they were less capable of regulating their
emotional responses when facedwith frustration.
More recently, 25 years ago, Strube et al. (1984)
identiﬁed another set of individual qualities that
could also affect the probability of aggressive
reactions, through their inﬂuence on the strength
of self-control. By frustrating test subjects by
asking them to solve unsolvable puzzles,
researchers found that the frustration effect was
more readily seen in participants with Type A
personality (given their lower ability for self-
control), than those with a Type B personality.
Interestingly, the interaction between personality
types and frustration was more apparent when
the participants engaged in hostile (that is,
emotional) aggression, than in the case of
premeditated instrumental aggression. These
results concur with the theory of planned
behaviour, whereby the prediction of intentions
is much more accurate in hostile aggression than
in instrumental aggression (Berkowitz 1989).
To improve the prediction of future adjust-
ment problems we also need to distinguish
between reactive and proactive aggression. For
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example, distinguishing the type of aggression is
very useful in coronary disease research. Indivi-
duals with a Type A personality, who are prone
to coronary diseases, tend to express more
anger, aggressive behaviour, self-destructive
tendencies and hostility. According to Vitaro
et al. (2002), a key variable in the increased
vulnerability to coronary diseases is the cold-
blooded interpersonal form of hostility, whereas
the warm-blooded neurotic intra-psychic form
does not predict this vulnerability (Bettencourt
et al. 2006). It also appears that a Type A
personality has a particular inclination to exhibit
a warm-blooded type of aggressive behaviour.
Reactive and proactive aggressions are
associated with different forms of development
in terms of delinquency, especially during
adolescence. One type of development, known
as the overt pathway, begins with aggressive
behaviour classed as proactive aggression (for
example, annoying others or starting ﬁghts),
followed by frequent physical ﬁghting and
ending in violence. Another type, the covert
pathway, forms of behaviour such as lying,
stealing or vandalism, which are also part of
the proactive instrumental form of aggression.
A third type, the authority conﬂict pathway, is
characterised in the beginning by stubbornness,
deﬁance and disobedience, which, with time, is
followed by truancy and running away from
home. Given the nature of the speciﬁc forms of
behaviour present, proactive aggressiveness
may predict early physical aggressiveness
(Vitaro et al. 2002), which could ultimately
increase the risk of overt and covert criminal
delinquency (Miller and Lynam 2006). This
tendency towards future delinquency and crime
can perhaps be explained, at least partly,
because this type of boy has more friends than
those with reactive personalities and probably
because these friends also tend to be proactively
aggressive. Therefore, for proactively aggressive
adolescents it is not easy to distance themselves
from ﬁghts given their weak self-control; it
seems that they attract aggression (Vitaro and
Brendgen 2005).
In contrast, reactive aggressiveness pushes
the individual to retaliate, which is a predictor of
aggressive responses within a negative cycle
(Crick and Dodge 1996) and authority conﬂict
(given the emotional confrontations between
reactively aggressive people and authority
ﬁgures). Vitaro (2002) and Vitaro and Brendgen
(2005) also suggest that reactive aggression may
be associated with anxiety and attention deﬁcit
disorder, somatic ailments and hypochondria.
Reactively aggressive people are more unstable,
excitable, hostile and temperamental and often
have no friends. Their relationships are ulti-
mately more violent than those of proactively
aggressive people. Unlike proactive aggression,
however, reactive aggression does not predict
subsequent criminal behaviour (Vitaro and
Brendgen 2005). Therefore, identifying indivi-
duals with personalities tending towards speciﬁc
types of aggressiveness helps to predict possible
future undesirable behavioural patterns.
Categorising aggression is
also important for its
affective control and
treatment
Identifying people with speciﬁc aggressive ten-
dencies also provides access to a range of
intervention strategies for preventing aggressive
acts, facilitating appropriate treatment and
reducing future interpersonal violence. This is
because different prognoses and treatments
require differing information processing
mechanisms. It is therefore important to deﬁne
clearly the different types of aggression, since
they may be associated with various potential
predictors, undiagnosed medical problems, psy-
chiatric comorbidity, environmental speciﬁcities
and so on.
Intervention programmes vary according to
the type of aggression. A practical intervention
has been described to prevent and control
aggression based on the following dichotomy:
afﬁliation substitution usingmore positive social
skills and the teaching of effective mechanisms
for confronting sources of conﬂict, frustration or
threats. While threats and appropriate incen-
tives may modify proactive aggression, the best
therapy for impulsive aggression appears to
involve changing the most striking features of
habitual behaviour that cause vulnerable people
to resort to provocation. Another example can
be found in the much debated theme of violence
on television (Ramı´rez 2007a): special efforts
should be made to protect the individuals most
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vulnerable to models presented in the media
from the potentially harmful effects of violent
scenes.
While anger-control techniques seem
appropriate for treating hostile reactively
aggressive people, programmes for treating
proactively and instrumentally aggressive
patients seek to change reinforcement contin-
gencies so that aggression does not receive
positive reinforcement. Though some authors
accept that cognitive behavioural therapy is a
good technique for instrumental aggression they
are very sceptical about the use of simple
psychological techniques against reactive hostile
aggression. In their opinion this type of aggres-
sion requires pharmacotherapy (Haller and
Kruk 2006).
In brief, profound knowledge of the corre-
lates of the different categories of aggression is
crucial in achieving maximum clinical effective-
ness in using the most appropriate intervention
programmes for the prevention, assessment,
control or treatment of aggressiveness as treat-
ments differ according to the type of aggression.
It is therefore necessary for researchers to reach
a consensus on the correct categorisation of
aggression, since without conceptualisation and
a taxonomy based on a sound theoretical basis
the diagnosis of aggressive disorders would lack
a solid foundation and, ultimately, its clinical
value would be regrettably much reduced
(Parrot and Giancola 2007).
Conclusion
In conclusion, aggression is a heterogeneous
construct with substantial semantic overlap with
terms for many different forms of behaviour
categorised by the intention to harm others. This
explains the large number of classiﬁcations
proposed in the scientiﬁc literature, according
to the form, mode and function of aggression. In
our opinion, it is more than advisable to
establish an appropriate categorisation of the
different functions and aims of aggression,
especially if further research is soon expected
to be conducted into the mechanisms and
functions of aggression and into the diagnosis,
prevention and treatment of abnormalities and
lack of control. We must never forget that
biology does not condemn humanity to violence.
In fact, the opposite is true: the better our
knowledge of human biology, the more capable
we will be of controlling violence. As the Seville
Statement on Violence (Adams et al. 1986, p.59)
concludes: ‘‘The same species who invented war
is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility
lies with each of us’’.
Translated from Spanish
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